

Citation Information:

**National Security Affairs,
Brzezinski Material, President's
Correspondence with Foreign
Leaders File (3), "Japan: Prime
Minister Takeo Fukuda, 2-12/77",
Box 11**

12

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
July 15, 1977


Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I congratulate you on your Party's showing in Sunday's Upper House elections. The outcome confirmed what I myself have learned in many elections: trust the voters rather than the polls.

I look forward to working closely with you in the months ahead as together we seek a more prosperous and stable global order, including wider cooperation between us in the field of nuclear energy. Our technical team has just returned from lengthy discussions with your own experts on the Tokai issue. They have spoken in glowing terms about the hospitality extended them and the close working relations they established with their Japanese counterparts. I appreciate your government's efforts to facilitate the work of the team. I believe we can find a compromise that will accommodate both our interests, and I will work hard to achieve it.

If you have any thoughts you wish to convey to me on this or other subjects, I hope you will feel free to utilize the telephone or the Cabinet line which provides a direct communication link between us.

Sincerely yours,



His Excellency
Takeo Fukuda
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6
PER 3/13/89 NSC RE NLC-99-01
BY [signature] NARS DATE 5/21/19

Citation Information:

**National Security Affairs,
Brzezinski Material, Country File
(6), “Japan 5-7/77”, Box 40**

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #122371 1930057
O 120817Z JUL 77 ZPF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

From Mansfield

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 STATE 16122371

NOBIS
FOR BRZEZINSKI ONLY
FOLLOWING REPEAT TOKYO 10376 ACTION SECSTATE JUL 12.
QUOTE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOKYO 10376
NOBIS
FOR SECRETARY VANCE FROM AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, TECH, ENRG, JA
SUBJECT: THE REPROCESSING ISSUE AND FUTURE U.S.-JAPAN RELATIONS

To Cy.
Inform Mansfield
that I will personally expedite the compromise decision. He can tell Fukuda. Give me without options delay JC

1. I HAVE BEEN AT THIS POST ONLY A FEW WEEKS BUT IT IS NOW CLEAR TO ME THAT THERE IS ONE POLITICAL ISSUE BETWEEN US AND JAPAN THAT WARRANTS BY SENDING YOU A DIRECT MESSAGE. I REFER TO THE NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING PROBLEM THAT LIES BEFORE BOTH GOVERNMENTS. I SUGGEST THAT ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM HAVE REACHED A CRITICAL STAGE. ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN SUBSEQUENTLY COULD HAVE PROFOUNDLY ADVERSE EFFECTS ON OUR FUTURE RELATIONS UNLESS WE URGENTLY SEEK A COMPROMISE WHICH BALANCES NON-PROLIFERATION CONCERNS AGAINST ENERGY NEEDS AND WHICH INSURES THAT THE REPROCESSING ISSUE IS ADDRESSED IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP.

2. FOR REASONS WHICH THE EMBASSY HAS ANALYZED AND REPORTED OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT VIEWS THE REPROCESSING ISSUE AS AFFECTING ITS VITAL INTERESTS IN WAYS WHICH OUR CURRENT ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES, FOR EXAMPLE, DO NOT. THE CLAIM HAS BEEN MADE BY HIGH-LEVEL JAPANESE OFFICIALS THAT THE U.S. DOES NOT UNDERSTAND JAPAN'S EXTRAORDINARY ENERGY PREDICAMENT, ITS COMMITMENT TO SOLELY PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, AND THE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JAPAN VIS-A-VIS THE WESTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS RELATED TO THE US-JAPAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT. I ATTRIBUTE SOME OF THIS DISCORD TO THE RECENT ELECTION CAMPAIGN, BUT THERE IS WIDE-SPREAD AGREEMENT AMONG JAPANESE ON THIS ISSUE AND A FACTUAL BASE TO THE JAPANESE ARGUMENTS WHICH WE MUST

Electrostatic Copy Made for Preservation Purposes

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

ZB AAR IVD VP LL

RECALLED
PSN: 711316 PAGE 01 TOR: 193/09:00Z DTG: 120817Z JUL 77

DECLASSIFIED *****CONFIDENTIAL***** COPY

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

5/13/99 NSL RE NLC-48-269

9 NARS DATE 5/25/99

3

BE ALERT TO AND WHICH WE MUST ADDRESS CAREFULLY AND THOUGHTFULLY AS THE NEXT ROUND OF POLITICAL-LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS APPROACHES.

3. SPECIFICALLY, THE ISSUE BECAME SERIOUS HERE IN APRIL, WHEN PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENTS, BOTH IN PUBLIC AND IN PRIVATE TO PRIME MINISTER FUKUDA, INDICATED THAT JAPAN COULD PROCEED WITH REPROCESSING, ONLY TO BE FOLLOWED BY "INTERPRETATIONS" OF THESE STATEMENTS TO THE CONTRARY. CHARGES OF "BAD FAITH" WERE LEVELED AGAINST US OFFICIALS, ALTHOUGH SUBSEQUENTLY A PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO FUKUDA CARRIED BY SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL STATED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD NO INTENTION OF AUTHORIZING OPERATION OF THE TOKAI MURA REPROCESSING PLANT AS ORIGINALLY INTENDED BY JAPANESE. THE PRESIDENT DID, HOWEVER, STATE THAT A COMPROMISE MODE OF OPERATION WOULD BE SOUGHT THROUGH NEGOTIATION.

4. THE LATEST PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF TOKAI IS NOW REACHING A CONCLUSION IN THE FORM OF A JOINT TECHNICAL REPORT WHICH WILL BE SUBMITTED TO BOTH GOVERNMENTS AROUND JULY 12. I HAVE BEEN BRIEFED ON THE NATURE AND CONTENT OF THIS REPORT. IT OUTLINES ABOUT 16 ALTERNATIVE MODES OF OPERATION FOR THE PLANT, SOME OF WHICH WOULD REQUIRE YEARS OF MODIFICATION EFFORT AND HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN COSTS. EVEN THE MOST MODEST CHANGE IN PLANS WILL BE TIME-CONSUMING AND EXPENSIVE. I AM CONVINCED THAT THE JAPANESE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE SOME ALTERATIONS TO THEIR ORIGINAL PLAN, PROVIDED REPEAT PROVIDED THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A DELAY OF SEVERAL YEARS AND THE EXPENDITURE OF LARGE SUMS OF MONEY BEFORE THE PLANT BEGINS TO FUNCTION. WHAT IS MOST DISTURBING, HOWEVER, IS THAT I HAVE HEARD RUMORS EMANATING FROM WASHINGTON THAT THE TECHNICAL STUDY WILL PROVE TO BE MERELY AN EXERCISE, RATHER THAN THE FOUNDATION FOR A POLITICAL COMPROMISE, AND THAT THERE ARE SOME IN THE US WHO WILL BE PRESSING THE PRESIDENT TO PERMIT NO REPEAT NO FORM OF REPROCESSING TO OCCUR AT TOKAI MURA. THE GROUNDS FOR THIS POSITION ARE SAID TO BE (1) WE CANNOT AUTHORIZE THE JAPANESE TO DO SOMETHING WE HAVE FORESWORN OURSELVES; (2) AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISTS WILL BRING SUIT AGAINST US TO STOP ANY ACTION WHICH PERMITS THE PLANT TO OPERATE; (3) IF JAPAN IS AUTHORIZED TO PROCEED WITH REPROCESSING IN ANY FORM, OTHER LESS STABLE COUNTRIES WILL DEMAND THE SAME TREATMENT; AND (4) THE PRESIDENT'S NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY WILL BE SERIOUSLY AND PERHAPS IRRETRIEVABLY ERODED.

5. THERE IS OBVIOUS MERIT TO THESE CLAIMS, BUT THEY

PSN:011316

RECALLED
PAGE 02

TOR:193709:002

DTG:120817Z JUL 77

MUST BE BALANCED BY THE POTENTIAL ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES. THE JAPANESE HAVE BEEN EXTRAORDINARILY BORTHCOMING AND COOPERATIVE IN REVEALING TO THE US EXPERTS THE TECHNICAL FEATURES OF THE REPROCESSING PLANT, AND HOW ITS DESIGN MIGHT BE MODIFIED TO BETTER MEET US PROLIFERATION CONCERNS. IF, AFTER THIS HIGHLY PRODUCTIVE STUDY IS SUBMITTED TO THE TWO GOVERNMENTS, THE US REJECTS IT AS THE BASIS FOR FURTHER POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS OR SELECTS ALTERNATIVES FROM IT WHICH ARE UNREALISTIC IN TERMS OF DELAY OR COST, AGAIN, THE US (AND BY IMPLICATION THE PRESIDENT) WILL BE ACCUSED BY THE JAPANESE OF HAVING NEGOTIATED IN BAD FAITH, FURTHER COMPLICATING THE ISSUE.

6. IN MY PERSONAL OPINION, THE REPERCUSSIONS WILL BE LONG LASTING, SEVERE, AND WIDESPREAD. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE IS ALREADY A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF PRESSURE BUILDING UP TO DIMINISH NUCLEAR SUPPLY TIES WITH THE U.S. AND TO TURN TOWARD THE SOVIETS FOR BT

OP IMMED
 DE RUEHC #122372 1938888
 O 122817Z JUL 77 ZFF4
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FINAL SECTION OF 2 STATE 16122372

NOOIS

FOR BRZEZINSKI ONLY
 URANIUM ENRICHMENT SERVICES, AND TOWARDS THE GERMANS, THE SWEDS,
 AND OTHERS FOR ADVANCED POWER PLANT TECHNOLOGY. -- LARGELY DUE TO
 THE PERCEPTION THAT THE U.S. IS NO LONGER A DEPENDABLE ALLY IN
 THE NUCLEAR FIELD. MOREOVER, FOR DECADES THE JAPANESE HAVE PER-
 CEIVED ASSURED ENERGY SUPPLIES AS ESSENTIAL TO SURVIVAL. WITH
 REMARKABLY FEW EXCEPTIONS, JAPANESE NOW SEE NUCLEAR ENERGY --
 AND DOMESTIC REPROCESSING -- AS INDISPENSABLE ELEMENTS IN
 MEETING THEIR FUTURE ENERGY NEEDS. OUR FAILURE TO HEED THESE
 BASIC CONCERNS COULD, I BELIEVE, LEAD THEM TO QUESTION THE
 NATURE OF OUR "PARTNERSHIP" WITH ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR
 SHARED WORLDWIDE ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES AND NORTHEAST ASIAN
 SECURITY. AND LAST, THE ILL WILL CAUSED AMONG THE JAPANESE
 PEOPLE IN GENERAL OVER WHAT THEY SEE AS THE HEAVY HAND OF THE
 U.S. BEING BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THEM, IN A WAY WHICH COULD
 THREATEN THEIR PERSONAL WELLBEING AND SECURITY, IS A FACTOR
 THAT MAY NOT BE IMMEDIATELY QUANTIFIABLE BUT WHICH IS REAL AND
 PERVERSIVE. IF THIS IS TO BE AVOIDED, COMPROMISE AS PROPOSED BY
 THE PRESIDENT IS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL.

7. I AM NOT IN A POSITION TO OFFER TO YOU THE TECHNICAL BASIS
 FOR A COMPROMISE; I LEAVE THAT TO THE EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES.
 HOWEVER, I AM OF THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE OPINION THAT, FIRST, A
 COMPROMISE IS MANDATORY IF THE BILATERAL ALLIANCE IS TO BE
 PRESERVED IN A FORM THAT IS FREE OF LINGERING JAPANESE SUSPICIONS
 AND BEST ENCOURAGES POSITIVE JAPANESE SUPPORT. SECOND, THE COM-
 PROMISE MUST BE REACHED EXPEDITIOUSLY -- WITHIN A VERY FEW
 MONTHS AT THE MOST; TO PROCRASTINATE LONGER WILL ACT TO HARDEN
 EACH SIDE'S POSITION. THIRD, THE COMPROMISE MUST INCLUDE
 PERMISSION FOR THE TOKAI PLANT TO OPERATE IN SOME MASHION AT
 THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. AND FOURTH, THE JAPANESE MUST BE
 PERMITTED TO RETAIN THE OPTION OF OPERATING THE PLANT FOR
 COMMERCIAL REPROCESSING PURPOSES IN THE EVENT THAT THE U.S.
 IS UNSUCCESSFUL IN STOPPING PLUTONIUM REPROCESSING THROUGHOUT

PSN1011318

RECALLED
 PAGE 01

TOR 193700102Z

DTG: 120817Z JUL 77

THE WORLD.

8. FINALLY, IN OUR CONSIDERATION OF THIS ISSUE WE SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT THE JAPANESE WILL BE COMPARING THEIR TREATMENT TO THAT WE ACCORD OUR WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES, IN PARTICULAR WEST GERMANY. THEY WILL ASK THEMSELVES, UNDERSTANDABLY I BELIEVE, WHETHER WE GIVE JAPAN'S NPT PLEDGES LESS CREDENCE THAN THOSE OF THE EUROPEANS AND WHETHER WE ARE PREPARED TO DENY THEM NUCLEAR FACILITIES WHICH THEIR EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL ALLIES -- AND COMPETITORS -- ALREADY HAVE. THESE ARE, OF COURSE, EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT QUESTIONS TO FIELD; THEY GO DIRECTLY TO THE HEART OF THE TRILATERAL CONCEPT.

9. IF YOU CONSIDER THESE PERSONAL VIEWS TO HAVE MERIT, I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD MENTION THEM TO THE PRESIDENT. I ALSO OFFER MY SERVICES IN REACHING A NEGOTIATED COMPROMISE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POSITION TO BE TAKEN BY THE PRESIDENT.
MANSFIELD UNQUOTE VANCE
BT

PSN1011318

RECALLED
PAGE 02

OF 02

TOR:193/99:02Z

DTG:1120817Z JUL 77